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RECENT DECISIONS

ABSTRACTS
Kathenne Kempfer*
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION RIGHT OF THIRD PARTIES To BE HEARD -The National Broadcasting Company is licensed to operate station KOA at Denver, Colorado, on a frequency of
850 kilocycles with a power of 50 kilowatts or more. This put it in the class
defined in the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission as "clear
channel stations.» 1 The 850 kilocycles was one of the schedule of Class I-A
channels to which only one dominant station, rendering primary and secondary
service over large areas and long distances, could be assigned, although a station
serving a more limited area could be assigned limited time or daytime only. 2
Station WHDH of Boston, Massachusetts, had a license to operate daytime only
on the 850 kilocycle frequency. In 1938 WHDH applied for an increase in
power and for operation unlimited in time. The commission set down the application and designated as issues for hearing the determination of adverse effect
on other stations and the question of public interest. Respondent NBC petitioned
to intervene and was denied. It then moved to dismiss WHDH's application for
failure to conform to the rules and regulations and was again denied. Apparently on the assumption that a possible change of its regulations would be involved, a member of the commission was designated to hold the hearing. 8 However, a new notice stated that no change in substantive rules was contemplated but merely a construction of existing rules. Issues were limited to application
of the rules and determination of adverse interests of other stations and an
examiner was assigned. A heari~g was held in January I 940 but respondent
was not permitted to appear or participate. The commission promulgated proposed finoings of fact and conclusions in which it voted, three to two, to modify
the regulations and grant WHDH's application. Respondent filed a second

* Managing Editor,
1
2
8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW.
Rules of the Federal Communications Commission,§ 3.21 (1939).
ld., § 3.25, as amended Sept. 10, 1940.
48 Stat. L. 1096 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1940), § 409 (a).
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petition to intervene' and was denied. However the commission permitted re-'
spondent to file briefs and present an oral argument amicus curiae. In April
1941 the commission adopted a final order amending its rules and granting the
WHDH application. Respondent filed a petition for rehearing, which was
denied. Thereupon respondent gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, which concluded that the commission's action modified respondent's license and therefore that respondent was entitled to be made
a party and to participate in the hearing. Held, four to two,4 speaking through
Justice Roberts, affirmed. The Federal Communications Act provides that no
order of modification shall become final until the license holder has been· notified
in writing and given reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should
not issue. Because of the definitions of clear channel stations adopted by the commission, which became a part of respondent's license, a change in these regulations constituted a modification of the license.~ The express provisions for notice
and right to show cause imply that the holder of the license is to become a full
party to the proceeding and therefore was entitled to be heard. Since it was a
party to the proceeding it must necessarily have the right to appeal. However, it
is also a "party aggrieved" 5 since although it does noi: allege economic injury
it does allege that the electrical interference caused by KHDH would be detrimental to the public interest. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that
th!! provisions of the act were adopted for the express purpose of limiting the
dilatory tactics previously followed by intervenors. In a number of instances the
act has expressly given the right to a hearing, so that it can be assumed that where
none was mentioned none was intended. Moreover the commission is given
wide discretion as to the conduct of its proceedings. Respondent had notice of the
proceedings, and under the rules of the commission could have presented evidence
even though not a party. 6 ,It therefore had opportunity to show cause. It,did not
show cause and in none of its petitions did it allege any economic loss or show
the nature and extent of the claimed interference. Justice Frankfurter also believed that respondent was not a ,"person aggrieved" entitled to appeal since it
claimed no substantial economic harm. Justice Douglas concurred in the dissent.
Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., (U. S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. rn35. 1
~PPEAL' AND ERROR - FINALITY OF ORDER - STAY OF EJECTMENT
PROCEEDINGS UNDER SoLDIERs' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT-In an
ejectment action the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings on the grqund
thaf the chief defendant is in the military service of the United States and cannot
be present to defend the action, a~d that the other .defendants are his wife, sister
and mother, and that the property involved is th~ir residence. Over plaintiff's
Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge did not participate.
47 U.S. C. (1940), § 402-(b) (2).
6 Rules, § 1.195.
.
7 See Caldwell, "Federal Communications Commission-Comments on Report of
the Staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Law," 8 GEo. WASH.
L~ REv. 749 at 770 ( I 940). And see generally, annotations on legal aspects of radio
communication and broadcasting, 104 A. L. R. 872 (1936); IZ4 A. L .. R. 982 (1940).
Case noted in 52 YALE L. J. 671 (194-3).
4
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objections, the court granted the stay as to the husband and wife. Plaintiff
moved for permission to proceed to trial as to the sister and mother. The court
overruled this motion but allowed an appeal from both orders. Held, the order
staying proceedings under the Soldiers' and Sai_lors' Civil Relief Act 1 is not a
final order and is not appealable. Appeal dismissed. Piercy v. Baldwin, (Ark.
1943) 168
(2d) II0.

s.w.

BANKRUPTCY -WHETHER BANKRUPT'S RIGHT OF AcTION FOR CoNsPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH His EMPLOYMENT P AssEs To TRUSTEE - M
was president of the Federal National Bank in Boston when it closed in December 1931. Nearly six years later, June I, 1937, M filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. November 27, 1937, he brought a tort action against several Boston
banks and their officers for damages for conspiracy to ruin plaintiff's reputation,
to drive him out of the banking business, and to deprive him of his livelihood.
The case was settled June IO, 1941, by a payment of $24,000 to defendant
herein, M's attorney. This cause of action was not listed in M's schedule of
assets and July 24, 1938, M obtained his discharge in bankruptcy. Two months
after the settlement, a creditor of M petitioned to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings, which was done, and plaintiff was named trustee. Plaintiff sued defendant attorney for the settlement payment or an accounting. The federal district court dismissed the action.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. The Bankruptcy
Act provides that the trustee in bankruptcy shall by operation of law be vested
with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date of the filing .of the petition, to all
"rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or injury to his property." 2 The tort action in question was for interference with an advantageous business relationship, but this relationship is not
property. The predominant injury charged was the ruining of M's reputation·
and the consequent destruction of his future earning capacity. Creditors are not
entitled to share in the bankrupt's future earning capacity. Boudreau v. Chesley,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 623.
BANKS AND BANKING - NEGLIGENCE - RIGHTS -OF PAYEE AGAINST
BANK FOR WRO,NGFUL DISHONOR OF CHECK -An insured deposited the sum
of $21.38 in defendant bank for the sole and specific purpose of paying the
premium on a life insurance policy with plaintiff insurance company, and drew a
check for that amount to plaintiff. Thereafter the bank wrongfully honored another check upon the insured's account and when plaintiff's check was presented
refused to pay it for insufficient funds. A few days later the insured died and
after a lawsuit plaintiff was compelled to pay the amount of the policy to the
beneficiary. In the present action plaintiff sued the bank in contract for the
amount of the check and in tort for the cost of defending the suit by the beneficiary. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint and dismissing the action. Held, affirmed. While the drawer may maintain an action for breach of contract to honor his check, the payee has no rights
1
1
2

54 Stat. L. II78, 50 U.S. C. A. (1943), Appendix, § 501.
In re Mullaney, (D. C. Me. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 768.
II U.S. C. (1940), § 110 (a) (6).
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against the drawee bank on an unaccepted or uncertified check. Likewise in the
tort action there was no legal duty on defendant to honor the check, and moreover the chain of causation had been broken by an independent responsible
wrongdoer-plaintiff's refusal to pay the policy. General American Life Ins:
Co. v. Stadiem, (N. C. 194-3) 25 S. E. (2d) 202.1
CONSTITUTIONAL_ LAW- COURTS -VALIDITY OF STATUTE AUTHORIZING. APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT -The Massachusetts legislature asked the opinion of the supreme judicial court upon the
constitutionality of a pending bill which provided for an appeal to the supreme
judicial court from a judgment of guilty of criminal contempt and provided that
the supreme judicial court might consider the· matter on the record and other
evidence or appoint a commissioner to hear the parties, determine the facts and
report to ~e court. The justices answered that such a statute would be unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers clause for it would be an encroachment upon judicial power by. the legislature. The opinion stated that the
legislature cannot interfere with the power to punish for contempt of courts established by the constitution or of other courts of superior or general jurisdiction,
and that to provide for a retrial upon the facts of a conviction for criminal contempt-at least in the cases of a direct contempt-is a substantial interference
with the power of the court to enforce its authority and with the orderly administration of justice. In re Opinions of the Justices, (Mass. 1943) 49 N. E.
(2d) 252.1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE PowER - PowER OF MuNICIPAL CoRP0RATI0N TO LIMIT HOURS OF BARBER SHoPs-Defendant appeals from violation of a city ordinance making it a misdemeanor to keep open a barber shop at
other than stated hours. HeU, overruling Wilson v. City of Zanesville/ the ordinance is void. Laws can limit the constitutional rights of individuals only when
justified by a substantial relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the public. .The ordinance in question can have no effect on sanitary conditions. A similar ordinance as to grocery stores was held unconstitutional 2 by this
court after the Zanesville case, and there can be no real distinction. In other
states, twelve have held such ordinances void while only three or four have taken
a contrary view. Three of the seven justices dissented. City of Cincinnati v.
Correll, 14-r OhfoSt. 535, 4-9 N. E. (2d) 412 (1943). 3
CORPORATIONS-RECLASSIFICATION OF STOCK-WHETHER MAY BE
ENJ_9INED AS INEQUITABLE-Defendant had· outstanding 21,160 shares of
1 Cf. annotation on the effect of the N. I. L. on the theory of a check as an assignment in 5 A. L. R. 1667 (1920).
1 Compare comments on the constitutionality of legislative provisions for jury trial
in contempt cases, 6 J. B. A. KAN. 270 (1938), and statutory limitations on contempt
proceedings, 9 id. 191 (1941). See also annotation on right to bring writ of error or
appeal from criminal contempt, 28 A. L. R. 40 at 45, 60 (1924).

130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N. E. 187 (1936).
Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N. E. (2d) 371 (1936).
.
3 See 37 M1cH. L. REv. 669 (1939); IO UNIV. C1NN. L. REv. 18'2 (1936); 20
A. L. R. IIII (1922); 98 A. L. R. 1088 (1935).
1

2
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preferred stock and 1,015,913 of common. The preferred stockholders were entitled to preferences of cumulative dividends of 7 per cent per annum, distributions in liquidation in the amount of $mo per share, and a redemption value of
$ l 1o, plus accumulated dividends. The common stock had no par value and
conferred participation rights subordinate to the preferred. Each share of each
class entitled the holder to one vote. From 1931 to 1939 defendant operated at
a loss. From l 940 to l 942 its earnings resulted in net profits, but no dividends
were paid on either class of stock since 1930 and at the end of 1942, the deficit
amounted to $2,440,068.34 while the unpaid accumulated dividends on the preferred stock aggregated $1,839,156.67. During 1942 defendant's officers, with
the approval and authorization of the directors and after conferences with holders
of large blocks of stock of each class, devised a plan of recapitalization. This involved a merger with defendant's wholly owned subsidiary and the conversion of
each share of defendant's preferred into one share of preferred and five shares of
common of the surviving corporation. Each share of defendant's common would
be converted into one-tenth share of common of the surviving corporation. The
new preferred would have preferences of cumulative dividends to the amount of
$2.50 per share per annum, a liquidation value of $50 and a redemption value
of $52.50, together with accumulative dividends. Each share of the new preferred and new common would have one vote, except that whenever the accumulated unpaid dividends amounted to $6.25 per share the preferred stockholders, as a class, would become entitled to elect a majority of the directors.
The agreement was approved by the directors of defendant and of the merging
subsidiary. A condition to its effectiveness was that it ·be approved by the holders
of two-thirds of defendant's capital stock of each class, and a preliminary survey
showed that a much greater proportion than that were in favor of it. Complainant, as the owner of two shares of preferred stock, filed a bill to enjoin the
merger, alleging that the reclassification was unfair to the preferred stockholders
since the common stock would be actually worthless in case of liquidation of the
corporation. Held, injunction denied. A merger with a wholly owned subsidiary
is a proper method of compounding preferred stockholders' rights to accumulated
dividends. Dissenting stockholders have the election of being paid off in cash and
plaintiff's only ground for seeking to enjoin the merger is one of "constructive
fraud." The fact that the common stockholders would realize nothing if the corporation were presently liquidated does not mean that such stock is worthless.
The corporation is not being liquidated, but is a going concern and the common
stock has a market value on the exchange. Complainant has ignored the fact that
under the proposed merger the common St!)ckholders give up their right of control. Weight must be given to the evaluation of the various rights by the parties
affected, and there is a presumption in favor of good faith. Porges v. Vadsco
Sales Corp., (Del. Ch. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 148.1
1 Cf. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) 11 L. W.
2877, holding that a "paper" merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary created solely for
the purpose of reclassifying preferred stock of a Delaware corporation and cancelling
accumulated unpaid dividends cannot be enjoined as a denial of due process where an
examination of the reclassification proposal leads to the conclusion that the plan is fair.
See also notes in 9 DuKE B. A. J. 38 (1941); 24 MINN. L. REv. 992 (1940); 25
WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 614 (1940).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RELATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS - STATE INSPECTION FEE ON FEDERALLY OWNED FERTILIZER_-A
Florida act 1 requires a label or stamp evidencing payment of an inspection fee on
each bag of fertilizer sold or distributed in the state. The purpose of the legisla- ·
tion is to assure consumers that they are obtaining the quality of. fertilizer for
which they pay and that substru,ices deleterious to· the soil will be excluded. The
United States, under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act,2 purchased commercial fertilizer outside Florida and undertook to distribqte it to consumers within that state without state inspection and without paying for or affixing the state inspection stamps. Under the national soil conservation and soil
building program, prospective farmers are entitled to a grant or benefit payment,
and phosphate fertilizers are furnished in advance through federal instrumentalities known as county committees or associations. The cost of the fertilizer is
deducted from the grant. The state commissioner of agriculture ordered the
county committees to stop distribution. The United States sought an injunction
in the federal district court against the enforcement as to it of the state inspection
fee. The injunction was granted. On appeal, held, affirmed. The United
States is the owner of the fertilizer, and the soil conservation program is a governmental function. Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the federal government is free from regulatio~ by any state in the absence of an express
authorization by Congress. The Court distinguished other cases 3 as involving
persons who were acting for themselves and not for the United States. Mayo v.
United States, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. n37.4
CONTEMPT- CRIMINAL CONTEMPT - NECESSITY OF SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH JUDGMENT BASED-Plaintiff in error was adjudged guilty of contempt of court and brought a writ of error alleging that there
was error of law in failing to make a detailed record to show that the general
conclusion of contempt was warranted •. The record merely stated that plaintiff
in error was "cited for contempt of court because of unwarranted conduct and
remarks addressed to the court for which a fine of $25 was imposed."· Held,
that criminal contempt is a summary proceeding and there is nothing in the
common-law precedent in England or the practice of Massachusetts to require
making the record with greater particularity than was done in this case. Silverton v. Commonwealth, (Mass. 1943) 49 N. E. (2d)-439.
CONTRACTS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACT FIXING VENUE OF EMPLOYEE'S
Surr UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT- Plaintiff, an employee
Fla. Stat. (1941), c. 576.
49 Stat. L. 163, 1148 (1935), 50 Stat. L. 329 (1937), 55 Stat. L. 257, 860
(1941); 56 Stat. L. 664 (1942), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1942), § 590a et seq.'
3 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939); ·
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941); Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 63 S. Ct. 617 (1943).
4 Cf. annotations on state tax on goods purchased by or for benefit of federal government, 56 A. L. R: 587 (1928), 140 A. L. R. 621 (1942); and federal government
or agency as subject 'to payment of tax or fee for recording or filing instrument, 124
A. L. R. 126'7 (1940).
1

2
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of the Chicago, Rock Island and ,Pacific Railway Company, was injured in an
accident at Rock Island, Illinois, where plaintiff was employed and resided and
still resides. The trustees in receivership of the railroad advanced plaintiff money
in consideration of which plaintiff signed an agreement that he would endeavor
to settle the claim but, if the claim were not so adjusted, that he would not start
suit in courts sitting outside the state of Illinois; that the sums advanced should
be applied on any liability determined by settlement, suit or otherwise and that the
advancement should not be considered an admission of liability. Thereafter
plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court for Minnesota, claiming that the
contract was void as an attempt to evade liability under sections 5 and 6 of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.1 Held, that the contract was valid. A contract
regarding venue made after the cause of action has arisen does not change the
liability of the carrier. The intention of the venue section was to give the plaintiff
a choice of jurisdictions in which to sue. He may exercise-that choice as well
by a contract before suit as by filing of suit. Certainly no one would question the right of parties to an action to stipulate as to the appropriate venue.
The contract is not against public policy, since Illinois is the most convenient
place of trial for all concerned and trial in Minnesota would put an extra burden
on the carrier at a time when it is heavily burdened due to the war. Of course
the contract may be set aside if it was secured by fraud, and the plaintiff may
have an opportunity to introduce evidence on that question before injunction
issues, Clark v. Lowden, (D. C. Minn. 1942) 48 F. Supp, 261, appeal dis·missed (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 740.2
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL - DEFENDANT'S APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT - Defendant was indicted in Lake County early in 1942 and pleaded not guilty. She was released on
bond. After various delays over a period of almost a year and just before the
expiration of the third term of court ( which would have automatically discharged defendant 1 ) the prosecuting attorney asked for a dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the state did not have sufficient evidence available
to try the case. The dismissal was granted over defendant's objection. In the
following term of court defendant filed a motion to be discharged, alleging that
the action of the court in dismissing the indictment was void. This motion was
stricken from the record and defendant appeals. Held, that an appeal can be
1
45 U.S. C. (1940), § 55: "Any contract, rul~, regulation, or device whatsoever,
the purpose of intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void."
Id., § 56: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of
action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action."
2
In general, see annotations on validity of contractual provisions limiting the place
where or the courts in which an action may be brought, 59 A. L. R. 1445 (1929); 107
A. L. R. 1060 (1937). And cf. injunction against suit under Federal Employers'
Liability Act on ground of forum non conveniens, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 247 (1942);
2 WEST. RESERVE L. N. 22 (1942).
.

1

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943), § 9-1403.
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taken only from a final judgment against the defendant and _that a judgment
dismissing an indictment is neither final nor against the defendant. Schaaf v.
State, (Ind. 1943) 49 N. E. (2d) 539.2
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT REMAINED SILENT WHEN AccusED OF CRIME IN PRESENCE OF PoLICE OFFICER - Defendant was convicted and sentenced of knowingly transporting a
female for the purpose of prostitution. At the trial the court admitted testimony
of a police officer that after defendant had been arrested he was taken to the district attorney's office where in the presence of the witness and others the girl told
her story and that defendant did not deny any or her statements. The superior
court granted a new trial because of the admission of this testimony.1 Held,
order for new trial reversed. It is a well established rule that defendant's failure
to deny an incriminating statement, is admissible in evidence. The various circumstances, such as defendant's involuntary presence, the presence of police officers, and his possible reasons for remaining silent, go to the weight of the evi~
dence but not its admissibility. Chief Justice Maxey dissented on the ground
that such a rule brings about injustice to innocent persons, since fear or retaliation by the police or of inaccurate recording are reasons for defendant's silence.
Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. (2d) 889 (1943).2
EVIDENCE - STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS - OPERATOR OF AUTOMOBILE
AGENT OF OwNER- Plaintiff was injured because of the negligence of T,
while driving an automobile belonging to defendant. Defendant, who lived in
New Jersey, maintained the car for the use of her son, a student at Yale. On
the occasion in question the defendant's son had loaned the car to T, a fellow
student, to attend a party. The Connecticut statute provides: "In any civil
action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the
negligent or reckless operation of such motor vehicle, the operator, if he be other
than the owner of such motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of such motor vehicle and operating the same in the course of
his employment, and the defendant shall have the burden of rebutting such
presumption." 1 Upon judgment for plaintiff, defendant brought error. Held,
that the statute is constitutional since the presumption is a reasonable one and
one applied by many courts without a statute. The statute goes farther than these
common-law cases in putting the burden of rebutting the presumption, rather
than merely the duty of introducing countervailing evidence, on the defendant.
But it does not go so far as to place the burden of disproving agency on the defendant. In this case there was not sufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict
AS

2 Cf. annotation on remedy for delay in bringing accused to trial or to retrial after
reversal, 58 A. L. )1. 1510 (1929).

151 Pa. Super. 431, 30 ~A. (2d) 229 (1942).
2 See II AusT. L. J. 59 (1937); 7 ST. JoHNS L. REv. 3n (1933); So A. L. R.
1235 (1932); II5 A. L. R. 1510 (1938).
1

1

Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935), § 1661c.
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of agency and the verdict will be set aside and a new trial ordered on the sole
issue of agency. One judge dissented as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Koops
v. Gregg, (Conn. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 653. 2
FEDERAL COURTS - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION - RELATION OF STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS - Persons adversely affected sought an injunction in
the federal district court against the enforcement of an order of Texas Railroad
Commission granting petitioner Burford a permit to drill four wells on a small
plot of land in the East Texas oil field. The district court declined to exercise
its jurisdiction. The circuit court of appeals reversed.1 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court by a five to four decision. The majority
opinion ( written by Justice Black) took the view that the federal court had
jurisdiction on the basis of the diversity of citizenship of the parties and the claim
of denial of due process but that the case was one where sound discretion required
that its jurisdiction should not be exercised. The opinion called attention to the
complexities involved in oil conservation and the fact that the federal government
has left regulation primarily to the states, to the complete system of review by
state courts set up by the Texas statutes and the possibility of ultimate review by
the United States Supreme Court, and to the confusion which had been caused
by previous decisions regarding oil conservation by lower federal courts which
had led to legislative changes later repealed after decision of the United States
Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter for the minority dissented on the ground
that there could be no distinction between the principal case and any case where
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship since confusion in interpretation of state law may result, and that the withdrawal of federal courts from
the diversity field is a fundamental change in federal policy which requires Congressional action. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 1098.2
INSURANCE - ACCIDENTAL DEATH - MEANING OF "ENGAGED IN
AERONAUTICS" - In 1930 defendant issued a life insurance policy on the life
of Frank C. Hart in which plaintiff was named as the beneficiary. The policy
provided for an additional death benefit in case of accidental death except where
death resulted from "having been engaged in ••• aviation or aeronautics, as a
passenger or otherwise." Hart was killed as the result of a crash of a passenger
plane in which he was a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled flight
over an established air route. Hart had no part in operating the plane during the
2
See 96 A. L. R. 634 (1935); 8 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937); 1941 Wis. L.
REV. 521, See generally, Morgan, "Presumptions," 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937);
Fegan, "Presumptions versus Proof in Automobile Highway Accidents," 22 GEo. L. J.
750 (1934).

1
Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 10, setting aside 124
F. (2d) 467.
2
See Yntema, "The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Controversies between Citizens of Different States," 19 A. B. A. J. 71, 149, 265 (1933); Clark, "Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts," id. 499 (1933); 13 St. JoHNs L. REV.
71 (1938); Bird, "Should Federal Court Jurisdiction Based on Diversity of Citizenship
be Relinquished?" 29 Wis. S. B. A. REP, 144 (1939); 21 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1942).
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flight and had at no time been engaged in aviation or aeronautics as an occupation. In a suit on the p~licy, the trial court dismissed the complaint and was
affirmed by the appellate div:s·on. 1 On appeal, held, reversed and directed for
plaintiff. The word "engaged" has an occupational connotation and does not
apply to ~n isolated flight as a passenger. In the same clause reference is made
to engaging in "military or naval service in time of war," which ha~ a clear
occupational significance. Words should not be used in one phrase with one
meaning and in the next phrase with a different meaning, and ambiguities must
be construed in favor of the insured. In later policies defendant has clarified the
ambiguity by stating that accidental death benefits will be payable to fare-paying
passengers in a licensed aircraft operated by a licensed pilot on a regularly scheduled flight over an established route. Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N. E. (2d) 687 (1943). 2
INSURANCE - SUBROGATION OF INSURER TO RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE
UNDER "Loss PAYABLE" CLAUSE-Plaintiff sued the insurer on a fire insur-.
ance p'olicy and the insurer counterclaimed. The present appeal involves only the
sufficiency of the counterclaim. Plaintiff purchased a tractor from Autocar on
a conditional sales contract, promising to insure against fire, theft and collision.
Plaintiff took out a fire insurance policy with defendant, payable to plaintiff and
Autocar "as their interests may appear." Plaintiff failed to make his payments
on the tractor and also failed to pay the insurance premium when due. Defendant notified plaintiff of cancellation of the policy but failed to notify the
vendor. Thereafter the tractor was damaged by fire to an amount exceeding
the balance due on the sale price. Defendant conceded that it was liable on the
policy to the vendor and paid it the amount of t~e balance due on the· sale price,
taking an assignment against plaintiff. In the present counterclaim, the insurer
seeks to recover from the purchaser the amount paid to the vendor. Held, affirming the courts below,1 there can be no subrogation. There was no express provision in the policy for subrogation. 2 Defendant was liable to "the vendor on the
policy and paid the vendor because of its obligation as insurer, not as a payment
of plaintiff's debt. Therefore this is not a case for equitable subrogation, especially as the insurer's loss is due to its own negligence in failing to notify the vendor
of the cancellation of the policy. Three of the seven justices dissented on the
ground that equitable subrogation could be granted here. Fields v. Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 N. Y. 209, 48 N. E. (2d) 489 (1943). 3
262 App. Div. 1008, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 826 (1941)."
See 38 MICH. L. REv. 413 (1940); 9 Am L. REv. 295 (1938); IO id. 415
(1939); IO J. AIR L. 421 (1939); 28 KY. L. J. 90 (1939); I WASH. & LEE L. REv.
127 (1939); annotations on liability under policy excepting risks of aviation, 69
A. L. R. 316 at 331 (1930); 83 A. L. R. 333 at 384_(1933). See, in general, death
or injury while flying as within policy of life or accident insurance, 14 A. L. R. 986
(1921); 40 A. L. R. u76 (1926); 57 A. L. R. 625 (1928).
1

2

1

265 App. Div. 891, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 757 (1942).

2

A subrogation clause is standard in New York in ordinary fire policies but not in

automobile policies.
3 See 31 ILL. B.

J.

331 (1943) and 52 A. L. R. 278 (1928).
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JUDGMENTS - DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-VALIDITY WHERE OTHER
REMEDY AVAILABLE - Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that an "election to take under the will" of his deceased wife, a release of claims and a receipt,
all executed by him, be declared null and void and that he be restored to his right
to file an election to take either under the will or under the law of descent and
distribution. He alleged that the above instruments had been executed by. him
upon the executrix' representation that property occupied by plaintiff and his wife
for the past twenty years was his sole property rather than the joint property of
himself and wife. The executrix denied plaintiff's allegations and also argued
that the remedy of declaratory judgment was not available since the administration was still pending and plaintiff had other remedies. The probate court
granted the relief requested by plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed on the
ground of no jurisdiction. Held, court of appeals decision reversed and cause remanded to probate court. In Ohio probate courts have had power to give
declaratory judgments longer than other courts.. The probate court would not
have jurisdiction of the subject matter at all unless an administration were pending. This state has not limited declaratory judgments in other courts to instances
where no other remedy is available. For practical reasons also, plaintiff's other
remedies might be valueless since the executrix might disregard his second election and distribute the estate to the other distributees, leaving him with personal
actions only. Radaszewski v. Keating, 141 Ohio St. 489, 49 N. E. (2d ) 167
1
,( 1 943).
JUDGMENTS - LANDLORD AND TENANT - SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER AS REs ADJUDICATA- Complainant obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining defendant from further prosecution of a summary dispossession action against it. Defendant sought to dissolve
the order. Complainant had rented certain property from the owner for a period
of five years and now claims to be in possession through the exercise of an option
for a two-year renewal exercised on October Io, I 940. On August 29, I 940,
the owner rented the property to defendant's lessor and on November 1, 1940,
complainant signed a five-year lease from defendant, undertaking among other
things "to handle and sell at said demised premises only petroleum products purchased from lessor and not to handle or sell thereat petroleum products of any
other supplier." In December 1941, defendant brought a summary dispossession
action against complainant, alleging breach of the foregoing covenant. The action was resolved in complainant's favor. In February 1942, defendant brought
another summary action alleging breaches since the dismissal of the first suit.
Complainant obtained the temporary injunction upon the allegation that the first
summary action was res ad judicata of his right to possession and that the sub1 See Borchard, "The Declaratory Judgment as an Exclusive or Alternative
Remedy," 31 MICH. L. REv. 180 (1932); 5 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 143 (1938); 19
N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 68 (1941); Glasser, "The Declaratory Judgment as an Alternative Remedy in Ohio," 4 Omo ST. L. J. 398 (1939); 5 id. 398 (1939); 13
Omo OP. 177, 334 (1939); 4 UNiv. Pim. L. REv. 59 (1937); 15 WASH. L. REv. 56
(1940); 44 YALE L. J. 694 (1<)35); 51 YALE L. J. 511 (1942). See also annotation
on jurisdiction of declaratory action as affected by pendency of another action or proceeding, 135 A. L. R. 434 (1941).
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sequent action was for the purpose of harassing complainant and that dispossession would cause irreparable injury to complainant. Held, that a summary dispossession action 1 ·does not result in a binding judgment between landlord and
tenant. The judgment protects _the court officer in removing the tenant but the
landlord is still liable in a trespass action if the dispossession was wrongful. Since
subsequent breaches may•have occurred, defendant had a right to prosecute its
second summary action, and since complainant does not allege a forfeiture or
any injury which cannot be compensated by damages, equity will not intervene.
Galka '11. Tide Water Associated Oil Go., (N. J. Ch. 1943) 30 A. (2d) 881.
LABOR LAW - DURESS - CONTRACT OF. EMPLOYMENT INDUCED BY
THREAT OF STRIKE - Plaintiff sued to set aside a contract on the ground that
it was obtained by duress and to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiff's operation of its theater. Plaintiff corporation was organized for the purpose
of operating a theater in Detroit, had spent large sums of money in rehabilitating
the building, in preparing for the presentation of theatrical productions and for
the proposed opening October 13, 1941. Plaintiff had a contract with defendant
stage hands' union. Several weeks before the opening agents of defendant musicians' union called on plaintiff's manager and insisted that it employ an orchestra
of six musicians and execute a written contract employing such musicians.
Plaintiff's manager refused, informing defendants that it did not desire, require
or intend to use any music whatsoever. Two hours before the proposed theatre
opening at 8:30 October 13, 1941, agents of both unions came to plaintiff's
manager and notified him that unless he signed a written contract with the musician's union to employ six musicians, the stage hands would strike, the theater
would be picketed, and the presentation of the theatrical production would be
prevented. As a result of this alleged duress, plaintiff signed a contract employing
six musicians for a year. The lower court held the contract valid and binding
and dismissed plaintiff's bill of complaint. On appeal, held, reversed. There
was no "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Michigan Act.1 "Furthermore, defendants may not claim that a bona fide labor dispute is involved when
the object they sought to accomplish was an unlawful labor objective." 2 To
compel plaintiff to employ musicians which it did not need or desire was an unlawful labor objective and invaded plaintiff's right to conduct its business without
unjust interference and its right to the free flow of labor. The facts show that
plaintiff acted under duress in signing the contract and the contract should be set
aside and vacated. However, no blanket injunction against all interference can
be given, particularly as the period covered by the contract has now expired.
The question is not moot since a renewal contract has been signed. While this
appeal cannot set aside the renewal contract, the principles here announced will
1

N.

J. Rev. Stat.

(1937), § 2-32-265 et seq.

1 Mich. Pub. Acts (1939), No. 176, § 2 (b): "The terms 'dispute' and 'labor
dispute' shall include but are not restricted to any controversy between employers and
employes or their representatives ••. concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining or changing terms of conditions of employment•• _••"
2 305 Mich. 193 at 214-215.
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be applicable to a subsequent suit to set aside that contract. Lafayette Dramatic
Productions v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 N. W. (2d) 57 (1943). 3
LABOR LAw-!NJUNCTIONs-DisPUTE BETWEEN RIVAL UNIONS AS
LABOR DISPUTE - Plaintiff, a retailer of men's shoes, sought an injunction to
restrain picketing by the Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, Local I I I5-F, an American Federation of Labor union. Plaintiff had a collective bargaining agreement
with Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union of New York, Local 1268, affiliated with
the Congress of Industrial Organizations. C. I. 0. was picketing stores employing members of defendant union and, after notice to plaintiff to execute a proposed contract with it within three days, defendant picketed plaintiff's store by
one picket who carried a placard to the effect that plaintiff was unfair to defendant union. There was no strike and no dispute as to wages or working conditions. The trial court granted a permanent injunction, which the appellate
division affirmed. Held, affirmed. The statute 1 restricting injunctions in "labor
disputes" was not meant to cover a retaliatory jurisdictional dispute between two
unions where the business and good will of an innocent employer is affected, or
to force the breach of a valid contract between an employer and its employees.
Three of the seven justices dissented. Dinny & Robbins v. D(1JU1,s, 290 N. Y.
IOI, 48 N. E. (2d) 280 (1943).2
LABOR LAW - INJUNCTIONS - FREE SPEECH - PICKETING FOR A
CLOSED SHOP - Plaintiff, a manufacturer of rainproof garments, sought to enjoin picketing and a so-called strike by the Waterproof Garment Workers'
Union. At the time the strike was declared none of plaintiff's employees were
members of the union, although afterward 29 out of 60 became members. The
object of the strike was a closed shop. The trial court granted the injunction.
Held, on appeal, affirmed. A strike for a closed shop is illegal and picketing for
that purpose is therefore not protected by the state picketing statute.1 The act of
1935 2 does not restrict or broaden the boundaries of permissible picketing. "Al3 Cf. Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. W. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), cert.
den. 314 U.S. 716, 62 S. Ct. 477 (1941), noted 39 MICH. L. REv. 665 (1941). See
also Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure," 20 N. C. L. REv. 237, 341 (1942).
1 N. Y. Civil Practice Act, § 876-a.
2 On analogous situations, see I BILL RTS. REv. 231 (1941); 15 UNJv. CINN. L.
REv. 339 (1941); 5 UNIV. DETROIT L. J. 132 (1942) (secondary boycott); 30 GEo.
L. J. 93 (1941) (suit by one union against another); 16 ST. JoHNS L. REv. 141
(1941) (same); 30 TEX. L. REv. 494 (1941) (same). Also see citations in 41 MICH.
L. REv. 1205 (1943). Cf. annotation on suit between labor organizations or members
thereof as involving a labor dispute within anti-injunction statutes, I 38 A. L. R. 287
(1942); annotations on validity and effect of statutes restricting remedy by injunction
in industrial disputes, 27 A. L. R. 4II (1923); 35 A. L. R. 460 (1923); 97 A. L. R.
1333 (1935); 106 A. L. R. 361 (1937); 120 A. L. R. 316 (1939); 124 A. L. R.
751 (1940); 127 A. L. R. 868 (1940). Case noted 56 HARV. L. REv. II67 (1943).
1 Mass Gen. Laws (Ter. ed. 1932), c. 149, § 24, as amended by Stat. (1933), c.
272.
2 Mass. Stat. (1935), c. 407, Gen. Laws, c. 149, §§ 20B, 20C, c. 214, §§ 1, 9,
9A, c. 220, §§ 13A, 13B.
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though picketing may be affiliated with free speech, a State is not required to
tolerate picketing of all types and may regulate and restrict it in order to avert
some definite substantial danger clearly arising from the methods adopted by
pickets." Fashioncraft v. Halpern, (Mass. 1943) 48 N. E. (2d) I. 3
-.
PUBLIC UTILITIES - BASIS .FOR CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY- REGULATED MONOPOLY OR REGULATED COMPETITION -The
Illinois Commerce Commission granted t4e Bluebird Coach Lines, Inc., a certificate of convenience and necess:ty to operate a motorbus line extension between
Berwyn, Cicero and Chicago. The application was opposed by the Chicago and
West Towns Railways, Inc., and by the trustee in bankruptcy for the Chicago
Rapid Transit Company. The circuit court having affirmed, an appeal was
taken to the state supreme court. Bluebird had for several years been operating
an intercity bus service between Joliet and Chicago on condition that it do no
local business between Berwyn, Cicero and Chicago, or within any of those
cities. Rapid Transit has for many years operated a system of elevated railways
throughout Chicago and its suburbs, including Berwyn and Cicero. vVest
Towns operates a system of bus lines and street cars in suburbs west of Chicago,
including Berwyn and Cicero. Transfer privileges are maintained between West
Towns and Rapid Transit and transfers are necessary to secure transportation
between the suburbs and Chicago under the existing facilities. Both vVest
Towns and Rapid Transit engage in "mass transportation" with cars designed
to hold the maximum number of passengers. While numerous runs are made,
all the cars and busses make frequent stops. Bluebird proposed to institute a
luxury express service which would provide more comfortable accommodations at
a higher price and make no local stops. In the hearings before the Commerce
Commiss:on the appellants had argued that if such service was found to be for the
public convenience and necessity they should be allowed the first opportunity of
affording it. Held_, that under the Illinois statute and cases public utilities are
regulated monopolies and that the commiss·on should have heard evidence as to
the ability of appellant to offer the additional service. Case remanded. A dissenting judge argued that the appellants had had ample opportunity in the numerous hearings before the commiss:on, covering a period of four years, to make
, a bona fide offer to furnish the additional service and that the findings of the
commission granting a certificate to Bluebird implied a finding that the appellants were not ready, willing and nble to furnish such service. Chicago & West
Towns Railways v. Illinois Commerce Commission. (Ill. 1943) 48 N. E. (2d)
320.1
3 See Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 M1cH.
L. REv. 1037 (1943); id. 1143 (1943); Howard, "Freedom of Speech and Labor
Controversies," 8 Mo. L. REv. 25 (1943); 90 UN!v. PA. L. REv. 201,227 (1941);
and citations in 41 M1cH. L.'REv. 760 (1943). On legality of strike for a closed shop,
see annotations in 6 A. L. R. 909 at 918 (1920); 16 A. L. R. 230 at 232 (1922); 27
A. L. R. 651 at 652 (1923); 116 A. L. R. 484 at 488 (1938).

1 See 11 J. AIR L. 163 (1940); 48 W. VA. L. Q. 271 (1942). And cf. annotation on right of a public utility not having an exclusive franchise to protection against,
or damages for, interference with its operations, property or plant by a competitor, II9
A. L. R. 432 (1939).
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T AXATl0N - INCOME T Ax-STOCK DIVIDENDS - Certiorari was granted
in two cases on the income taxation of stock dividends because of conflicting
lower court decisions. In No.· 22 1 respondent owned voting stock in an Oregon
corporation which paid a ten per cent stock dividend in shares of non-voting
common stock. Two classes of stock, voting common and non-voting common,
were outstanding. The dividend was d:str.buted to holders of both. Neither the
voting rights of the voting common, nor its right to share in dividends and in
liquidation, was altered by the distribution. In No. 66 2 petitioner owned 200
shares of common-the entire stock of a corporation. By charter amendment an
issue of 500 shares of non-voting preferred stock was authorized. The directors
voted to distribute part of the issue to the stockholders and petitioner received 50
shares as a stock dividend. Held, in neither case should stock dividend be considered as income for the purposes of taxation. Helvering v. Griffiths 8 governs.
Koshland v. Helvering 4 can be distinguished. That case held that a dividend
paid in common on preferred stock was taxable, but there was a change in the
proportional interest of the shareholder. It did not mean that any change whatever in the character of the shares issued as dividends resulted in the receipt of
income. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791 (1943). 5
TORTS - CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF BROKER'S COMMISSION
- Plaintiff brought action for damages for an alleged conspiracy preventing
plaintiff from completing a sale of real estate and thereby earning his commission.
Plaintiff was a real estate broker and defendants were the seller and buyer of a
large apartment property. Plaintiff was employed by the owner to sell the
property and after negotiations covering a period of several months had procured
a buyer at terms agreeable to the seller, except that the buyer desired plaintiff
to remit $7,200 of his standard $8,200 commission. Plaintiff refused to do so
and in.formed the owner of the buyer's attempt to deprive him of his commission.
Thereafter, apparently at the suggestion of the owner, another broker completed
the deal on the buyer's terms. The jury found for plaintiff. The Appellate
Division affirmed. 1 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed by a four
to three decision. The majority found that the jury's verdict of conspiracy was a
fair inference on the facts and held that an unjustified interference with the
right of plaintiff to pursue his lawful occupation and receive the fruits of his
labor is an actionable wrong. The minority, assuming that a cause of action
would exist for conspiracy, believed that the facts did not S!:}fficiently prove a
conspiracy in the instant case. Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N.Y. 297, 49 N. E.
(2d) 146 (1943)!
1

(C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 973, reversing 42 B. T. A. 484 (1940).
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 315.
3
318 U. S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636 (1943), abstracted 41 M1cH L. REv. 1209
(1943), noted 91 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 770 (1943).
4
298 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 441 (1936).
5
See citations in 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1209 (1943).
2

1

263 App. Div. 983,34 N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (1942).
See 40 M1cH. L. REv. 1273 (1942); IO DuKE B. A.
A. L. R. 1273 (1935).
2

J.

56 (1942); 97
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TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY OF SCHOOL TEACHER FOR INJURY
TO PUPIL -Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries sustained in a fall
from staging around a building in process of construction. The superintending
school committee of the town of Madison, having caused a rural school building
to be torn down, voted to construct a vocational training building in the village
near the high school building, using material, so far as sufficient and suitable,
from the razed building, and using labor of the boys in the manual training
classes supplemented by young men of the N.Y.A. The students were not compelled to work on the neW' building; they were .not permitted to work if their
parents objected. They received no compensation,' though what they did constituted a part of their school course work, for which they were given credit,
and in time was confined to their instruction period~. On the day of the accident,
plaintiff and another boy had been instructed by defendant, their manual training
teacher, to go to the building in process of construction, around which a temporary staging had been erected, and shovel off the snow from the staging and
the roof. While plaintiff was on the upper staging, a "ledger board" which
helped to support the floor of the staging broke, although new, in the vicinity
of a certain knot hole, causing plaintiff' to fall to the ground. In the trial, the
jury held for defendant. Plaintiff excepted, alleging error in the instructions
as to the ,duty owed plaintiff by defendant. Held, exceptions sustained. A
teacher, being "in loco parentis," has the care and custody of his pupils, and
must act so as not negligently to injure them, whether the act is one of misfeasance or nonfeasance. But there is also. a common-law duty on every one
not to act or use that which he controls so as negligently to injure another person •
. It is a question of fact for the jury whether defendant had full charg~ of the
erection of the building. If defendant had full charge of the building, he assumed the duty to use due care and proper precaution so that no negligent act
of his, either of commission or omission, should proximately result in inj_ury to
his pupils. Therefore, the instruction that defendant was responsible for his own
acts, without clarifying whether failure to act was embraced within the words
"his own acts," was erroneous and prejudicial to plaintiff. Brooks v. Jacobs,
(Me, 1943) 31 A. (2d) 414.1
TRUSTS - INSURANCE-WHETHER INSURANCE A TRUST FOR PURPOSES OF AccuMULATION STATUTE -A~ insured named his three minor children as beneficiaries of five life insurance policies. The terms of the contracts
provided, with minor variations, that the amount payable at death of the insured
would be held by the company as trustee but that the fund should not be
segregated and that the interest would be determined at a fixed rate. The interest was to be accumulated until the children became twenty-one years of age
and then the accumulated interest paid, and thereafter interest to be paid
periodically. The principal was to be paid over at the age of thirty. After
insured's death, his widow, as general guardian of two of the children, thirteen
1 See 12 BROOK. L. REV. 64 (1942); 28 CAL. L. REV. 237 (1940); 87 L. J.
(N. S.) 158 (1939); 17 ORE. L. REv. 251 (1938); H ScoT. L. REv. 205, 248
(1939); 6 YEARBOOK SCHOOL LAW 68 (1938); 7 id. 103 (1939); 8 id. 92 (1940);
9 id. 79 (1941); IO id. 76 (1942).
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and sixteen years of age, brought this proceeding alleging that she was without
funds, and that no other funds were available for the support of the children.
She prayed for an order directing the insurance companies to pay over suitable
sums for the support and education of the children under section I 7 of the
Personal Property Law. This section provides "When a minor, for whose
benefit a valid accumulation of the income of personal property has been directed,
shall be destitute of other sufficient means of support or education, the supreme
court ••• may ••• cause a suitable sum to be taken from the moneys accumulated .•••" Held, in a four to three decision, affirming the special term and the
appellate division,1 that the court has no power to direct such payments. Section
17 applies to "income of personal property." The amount due under the
insurance contracts are debts, and there is no specific trust res. Although the
term "trust" was used in the contracts, actually there is no real trust involved.
Other statutes regulate life insurance trusts and permit spendthrift provisions in
life insurance contracts, so that the legislature was aware of the distinction
between such contracts and real trusts. The dissenting judges argued that there
was no basis for distinguishing between life insurance settlements and other
trusts, for the purpose of section I 7, and that the legislature might well have
used the phrase "valid accumulation of the income of personal property" in its
more popular meaning. In re Nires, 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d) 268 ( 1943).
WILLS - ANTI-LAPSE STATUTE - ADOPTED CHILD As IssuE - In a suit
by the executor for construction of a will, it appeared that the testatrix had given
her home to her deceased husband's nephew, C, with a gift over if C should
predecease her to her own nephew, T, and had given the residue of her estate
to T and C equally with no provision in the case of the failure of either to survive. At the time of the execution of the will testatrix knew that C had adopted
a child, the respondent. C died two years before testatrix. The lapse statute 1
provides that the issue of the predeceased devisee or legatee shall take his share
"unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." The adoption statute 2
provides that for the purpose of inheritance an adopted child shall be considered
the child of the parents by adoption. T argued that the will showed an intention
not to give any property to C's child and that in any case an adopted child could
not be issue. Held, for respondent. The express provision for a gift over to T
in one clause does not support an implied gift over to T in the other clause,
but rather the contrary. And in light of the adoption statute, an adopted child
is clearly "issue" under the lapse statute. Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, (R. I.
1943) 32 A. (2d) 269.8
1

264 App. Div. 841, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 759 (1942).

1

R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 566, § 30.
R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 420, § 6.
See 2 UNiv. NEWARK L. REV. 204 (1937).

2
8

